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I - .
A. THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
How has agricultural policy changed over the years? Prior to
the closing of the western frontier and for the first,150 years
of this nation's history, government involvement in agriculture
was primarily limited - to: - (1): land ownership, .and settlement
policy,' (2) scientific input., .and (3> basic regulations. So, the
U-Sb essentially had a market oriented policy-
The western frontier closed and the depression hit- .The
farm economy was devastated. The consequence of free market is
that it sometimes results in price extremes- One infamous South
Dakota market quotation ' reported in Don Paarlberg's book
"American Farm Policy" reported: #2 shelled corn at ^ cents/bu-j
#3 at 3 cents/buop # 4 at 2 cents and eared corn 3 cents iess»
Unemployment was 25 percent and many farmers lost their land.
The (Sreat Depression caused a distinct change in
government's role in agriculture- For the first time in the
' • ' ' ' f 1 • . . ;
nation's history, government intervened in the market place to
support prices on behalf of farmers-
The first attempt was the Federal Farm Board of the late
1920s- It established a grain reserve. The concept was for the
governemnt to buy low and sell high thus acting as a market
stabilizer- However, the history books treat the program as a
failure because it was top little, too late and was overwhelmed
by the magnitude of the Great Depression.
In 1933, the U.S. instituted the Agricultural Adjustment Act
(AAA), which is regarded as the forerunner of our current farm
policy. Initially, parity price supports were implemented
without production controls. This simply added to the surpluses
until production controls were added as a precondition for
receiving support payments.
Although many developments have occurred in agricultural
polciy since the 1930s the basic concepts have remained the same-
The government has been periodically stabilising and supporting
prices, setting—aside acreage and acquiring grain reserves ever
since. My point is that the pendulum does swing upon occasion
and usually during a crisis.
B- AGRICULTURAL POLICY AS A SHOCK ABSORBER
In all years since the Great Depression, the U.S. has
planted between 330 and 390 million acres to crops. Sometimes you
see a lower set of numbers for program crops because some crops
are excluded.
Prior to the Depression we operated our agricultural plant
at full capacity. With the implementation of the AAA we reduced
our acreage in production and accumulated an "ever norma]
granary-" Then in response to World War 11, we expanded
agriculture to peak capacity once again. The U-S- operated above
370 million acres in the 19'tOs until 1955.
In the mid-fifties, we began to accumulate large grain
reserves and instituted land-retirement programs such as the
"Soil Bank" were implemented to reduce farm production. As a
result, U.S. agriculture operated at below 3A0 million acres from
1961 to 1972- During the late 1960s, the U-S- began reducing
grain reserves and completed this task with the irrfamous 1975
Russian Wheat Deal.
After 197Hj unprecedented'export demand more* than offset the
bringing of 30 million acres back in production^ Record farm
prices and incomes resulted in spite of'expandeci acreage- Exports
were growing 8 to 10 percent per year- As a result, we were
expanding production 4 to 5 percent per year"'- ' By 1978, - U..S-
agriculture was back up to peak crop acres 'arid policymakers,
economist, lenders and farmers all thought that the good times
were going to continue into perpetuity-' They simply didn't.^
The early 19BOs provides a classic case of the stages of
agricultural overcapacityn First, export demand caused • total
demand to drop. Second, government"'grain reserves began to
accumulate. Third, it became cheaper for government ' to pay
farmers to set'-aside land rather than store additional grain.
U.S. acreage in production remained at full tilt until the
1983. We kept hoping for the export demand to return- While the
U»S- has since recovered market, share, total world trade in
grains has experienced almost no .growth during the decade of the
1980s. -In- 1983, we. instituted a Payment-In-Kind program.
Although- .a drought had_ some impact, 1983 turned out to be the
largest one—year acreage blip in history. We went from peak to
. trough, to,peak, acreage again all in" the process of three years-
Then, we debated the 19S5 Farm Bill. A major'conclusion' of
the debate was .that, the 'rules, of" the agricultural economy had
changed. In the 1960s, with an inelastic domestic demand for
food, the U.S. raised support prices and thus increased farm
income^ However in the 1980s, the U.S. relied more heavily upon
export markets- After support prices were increased In the J9B3
Farm Bill, international competition undercut our prices and
expanded their production forcing more of the adjustment upon
UeS. farmers- This coupled with a rising exchange value of the
dollar dramatically reduced agricultural exports and contributed
to the farm depression of the 19S0s- The U.S. could no longer
design domestic commodity programs in isolation of interatipnal
trade policy and the global politics of trade.
As a result, policymakers and agricultural interests
designed a 1985 Farm Bill that would make the U-S- competitive in
world markets, protect farmer income and keep government costs
low- In general, the 1905 Farm Bill was successful on two of
three goals» It immediately lowered loan rates, froze and then
slowly reduced target prices- It experimented with tiar'kcting
Loans and PIK certificates- It established a long-term land
retirement program called the Conservation Reserve Program <CRF)-
C- WHAT ARE THE CURRENT TOOLS AND HOW DO THEY WORK?
I- PRICE AND INCOME SUPPORTS-
~ NONRECOURSE LOANS, LOAN RATES, PRICE SUPPORTS.
The Commodity Credit Corporation <CCC) makes nonrecourse loans at
established rates to farmers for wheat, feedgrains, soybeans,
cotton, sugar, wool, tobacco, and honey- If the market price is
above the loan rate, the farmer can repay the loan, plus interest
and storage, within"9 to 12 months and then sell the commodity on
the cash market- If the loan rate is above the market pricc? the
farmer may forfeit the grain to the CCC as full payment for the
loan and thus receiving the loan rate as the market priccn "The
nonrecourse commodity loans are frequently referred to as price
supports because as the national market price falls below the
loan rate, more farmers forfeit loans and the CCC acquires enough
grain from the market to keep the market price from falling to
far below the loan rate-
- TARGET PRICE, DEFICIENCY PAYMENT, PROGRAM YIELD, PAYMENT. RATE.
Deficiency payments are sometimes referred to as inqome
and are payments made tb farmers' in return for participating in
acreage set-asides and- complying with -other -farm
requirements. Target prices and deficiencypayments are set for
cotton, wheat, corn, grain -sorghum, oats and
deficiency payment equals" the payment.rate times . e pi g
yield times the farm program acreage.- The payment rate is i^e
difference between the politically established target pric
the higher of the commodity loan rate or the national average
market price. In general, the program yield for a farm, .is based
on' the county average program yields for the
dropping out the' highest and lowest year. . Jhe farm program
acreage is the farmer's crop acreage base less set-aside and
diverted acris. The crop acreage base
average acreage that would normally have been planted to the crop
for harvest during the previous fiveyears-
~ MARKETING LGANS-' •
Amarketing loan is a nonrecourse loan with a.rcpaymcnt rat^ that
may be lower'than'the announced.loan-rate. . In_general, it zne
market price goes below the announced .loan ratev the CCC may
the repayment rate to the world price- Thus ins ea c
forfeiting the grain to the CCC, the farmer repays the loan at
the lower repa^meAt raie and sells the grain on the cash market.
In general, the marketing loan repayment rate becomes the markeI
price flocif^ and- the'CCC effectively pays farmers the difference
between the repayment rate and the announced, loan rate- The
marketing loan changes the -nonrecourse, loan concept from a price
support program to a price sind income support program-
- GENERIC payment-in-kind CPIK): CERTIFICATES-
A generic PIK certificate i-s-a ihegotiable ^commodi ty certificate
that can " be redeemed by -the ^ho Iderfor farmer-owned reserve
commodities, any uncommitted CCC reserve commodities or cash- The
certificates 'are issued to' complying farm.program participants in
lieu of cash payments under a variety of provisions in the ^
Farm Bill. The certificate is issued for a dollar amount;,
therefore the amount of aJcbmmodity that can. be redeemed is
determined by the daily redemption price as determined by the
CCC- The negotiability of the certificates allows for the sale
and resale of the'certificates.up to their specified, expiration
date- The certificates allow the government to reduce grain-
roserye stocks and storage costs without having market pi ice
reach the normal release price levels- - Therefore, the government
is'not likely to use certificates if .government stocks are low.
PAYMENT LIMITATIONS
Payments received under the wheat, feed grain, cottonp and rice
programs are limited to $50,000 for all g^O
year except for disaster payments which are limited to $100,000
per person per year» This does not include nonrecourse loans,
compensation for recreation, marVieting loans, certain portions
deficiency payments resulting from reduced loan rates, inventory
reduction payments, cost reduction measures by the Secretary.
II. PRODUCTION CONTROLS-
- ACREAGE REDUCTION PROGRAM, SET-ASIDES, DIVERSION PROGRAM.
The Secretary annually has the authority to announce
limitations, set-asides, or paid land diversions i
supplies are expected to be excessive. If a set-aside
has been announced, farmers must set-aside a certain
their crop acreage base in order to be eligible •
commodity 'loans, purchases, deficiency and other
Acreage diversion programs pay producers a given amount per acrc
to idle a percentage of their base acres. The crop acreage ba
generally represents the average acreage that would normally hav
bee^ planted to the crop for harvest during the previous five
years.
- LONB-TERIi LAND RETIREMENT, CONSERVATION RESERVE PROBRAM (CRP)..
Long-term land retirement is a voluntary
which the government pays farmers an annual ren mmmoditics
to remove cropland from the production of surplus "
The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) is a hiqhly
retirement program that provides incentives for tat.ing .^ 9^ y
erodible cropland out of production. In periods
excess agricultural capacity exist, operating a long m ^
retirement program in conjunction with annual ^
programs can reduce the government per acre costs of taking land
ou^of production. However, increasing the acreage ^9
term land retirement programs reduces P''°Sram ^
in meeting wide annual variations in commodity demand and use.
-ACREABE ALLOTMENTS, MARKETINB QUOTAS, MANDATORY CONTROLS.
Mandatory controls refer to acreage allotments and
quotas imposed by government on all producers in -- such
?he production of a commodity. In one ]e
supply management tools would only be imposed after a favorablevote L a farmer referendum. In the case of ^->--^90 allotments
the restrictions are placed on the acres that may be planted. In
the case of marketing quotas, the P^^^orcd or
quantity that may be sold, the remainder must =™
disposed of outside the restricted market. The nu ^
allotted to each farm or the marketing quota
percentage of the farm's production history-- The percentage xs
based on the estimated national production needed to meet supply
objectives- In some cases, "certi'ficates might be issued to those
holding quotas ' or allotments that would allow' each producer to
buy or sell the rights to produce- In this case, the value of
the allotments or' quotas^are capitalized into a- market value or
the certificates- ' - f. ' : j.
- P(;5qGRAM CROSS-CQMPLIANCE,'OFF-SETTINS CQMPLIANCE--
Cross—Comp1iance provisions requires farms that produce more,than
one program crop to participate' in the commodity programs foi all
of the commodities in order, to be-el igible'- to receive loansp
purchases or pa:yment5 for any one oF the commodities- Sometimes
commodity programs have adverse impacts on other commodities-
Imposing cross—cbmpliance^increases the acreage reduction cosL
efficiency of farm legi'sl'atiori, however, such -provisions are
ofteri • strongly resisted by farmers- Off—setting compliance
provisions require a producer of a" commodi€y ' to. be :ihr ..^comp 1iance
with the program requirements on all farms in order to be
eligible to receive prdgram benefits- •- "
nr. V
- CONSERVATION COMPLIANCE, SODBUSTER, SWAMPBUSTER.
=" ' 1 0--
Conservation compliance requires farmers of highly erodible land
to have an SCS conservation- plan Yor ^the farm approved by ,January
1, 1990 and implemented by January 1, 1995. The sbdbuster
provision prevents farmers from' brihging"-""additional-i . hiighly
erodible farmland into production if it had not be farmed during
1981-85- The swampbuster provision prevents: farmers, ;from
draining., and converting, wetlands into cropland for production^
Farmers who violate the above provisions are not ^eligib]e for
farm program benefits and are barred from certain additional
programs- " ' - • n, _
" - -t ' .tv .1 • .O' ... '1
III. GRAIN RESERVES-
- COMMODITY CREDIT CORPORATION (CCC) STOCKS-
• ' ' • - ' • • " . L • . I' ^ ' r . ,, . . :
The Commodity Credit Corporation has no recourse but to acquii e
grain when tKe market price tf a pv ogr-am commodity falJs below
the commodity nonrecourse loan rate, giving farmers an incentive
to forfei t'^"their" grain- CCC--may not sell any of' i.ts wheat., >cpro?
grain sorghum, barley oat, or rye at less than 115 percent of the
national average loan'rate adjusted 'for-^^market; differ en trials and
carrying charges- However, if the marketing loan provisions arc
in' effects the sale price cannot -be 'I'ess than'115 percent'Of the
average loan repayment rate for the crop. In the case of the
marketing ' loan, the - loan fep'ayment-rate-' is'---at orj below the
announced loan rate for the commodity. However, various
certificates may be used to'release uncommitted CCC stockseven
though market prices have not risen to CCC sales price..
• FARMER-OWNED RESERVE (FOR).
The Farmer-Owned Reserve program provides original or extended
price-support loans to encourage producers to store wheat and
feedgrains for three years or longer- The FOR loan rates must be
equal to or higher than current commodity nonrecourse loan rates.
The farmer must continue to store the grain until the loan
matures unless the market price rises above a specified release
price which 140 percent of the commodity loan rate, or taiget
pricej whichever is higher. The amount of grain allowed into the
FOR is limited to a percent of domestic and export use.. This
30 percent for wheat and 15 percent for feedgrains. Here again^
certificates may be used to release FOR stocks at any time-
D- THREE LEVELS OF DEBATE«
There have been three levels of debate over commodity policy
• in recent farm bills. There has been debate over Cl) the level
of price and income supports, (S) the program structure, and (3)
who should decide the policy parameters.
In regards to the level of supports, pegging the supports to
the parity index is often favored by those who want higher price
supports- However, there are some technical problems associated
with using an index that does noL make an allowance for changes
in agricultural productivity over the years. Pegging the
supports to average cost of production was tried in the 1970s and
early 19805. However, in the early 1980s costs continued to rjse
while market prices dramatically dropped thus contributing to the
declining share of world commodity markets for the U.S.. A thiid
approach is to set supports relaUive to an average of recent
market prices- This provides both upward and downward prj.ce
flexibility to be competitive on world markets, bub also provides
a cushion from dramatic price changes as well. A forth approach
is not to peg supports to any index and either allow the supports
to set in the. Farm Bill or allow the Secretary to set them
annually based on an analysis of the competition.
The second level' of • debate'revolves around the. structure erf
the commodity programs- Since the 1930sp policymakers and
interest groups have debated free market policy, voluntary supply
management programs, and mandatory supply management-
The market approach Mould remove • many^ of the current
programs and allow "survival of the fittest" to take place. This
approach would ' tend to ihcrease exports- and place •increasing
pressure on other exporters to either increase their subsidies or
reduce their excess capacity-"- The 'lease competitive U-S- farmers
would exit From production to other-'endeavors-
The present commodity programs are voluntary- . Farmers
voluntarily choose whether or not to participate' in commodity
programs. The incentives' to participate depend upon how, the
farmers perceive • the benefits- in return for costsf of
participation- The participating farmers agree to reduce
production in return for'goverment payments and other benefits-
Mandatory controls reduce'- excess capacity by enforcing
penalties on those who" do"' not' comply with the mandatory
restrictions. Under mandatory controls, acreage allotments or
marketing quotas are used to restrict production. Jn a pure
mandatory control system production is restricted to until prices
increase to target levels, so there would be no government cosls«
• ' • ' • '-i' ' ^
However, recent proposals have included standby nonrecourse loans
to be implemented if target price- levels were not reached.
Unless export subsidies and/or an international cartel is
established, this structure would likely result in a declining
share of world markets for U..S.. agricultural commodibies.
The Final level of debate is over who should set the policy
parameters- Congress may prescribe the parameters in the Farm
Bill« The Secretary of Agriculture may be given the authority to
set the parameters based on prescribed or unprescribed rules- A
third independent policy board, has been suggested from time to
time by various special interest groups.
An independent board could be,given the authority to set the
farm policy parameters much like the Federal Reserve Board
establishes monetary policy- Perhaps the "revised golden rule
applies here, "Those with the gold, rule-" Only in few
exceptions, has sweeping authority been granted to independent;
board- A policy board made up solely of farm interests is highly
unlikely .unless farmers agree to self-finance the commodity
programsp Recent commodity check-off programs are an example oF
this approach- Revenue insurance, mandatory multiple-peril crop
insurance and/or commodity assessments might represent a move in
this direction- However, until then, most of the policy-making
power is likely to rest with the Congress and the Secretary-
E. HOW DO YOU EVALUATE THE POLICY ALTERNATIVES IN THE FUTURE?
The 19B5 Farm Bill debate settled around three simple goals
that were viewed as problems or inadequacies resulting from the
previous Farm bills (1) competitiveness, (H) farm income
protection, and (3) government costs- In the discussions with
many farm organizations, agribusinesses and consumer and
environmental groups, I am presently hearing a multitude of
objectives- I have provided a list of la objectives (Table 1).
The debate may or may not eventually settle on a reduced list
(-I
of maior concerhs. ' The three objectives presently appearing-at
the top of current rhetoric for commodity programs are: (1)
competitiveness, <2) flexibility and ^3) goveirnment costs.
Some analysts are suggesting - that the -drought' ' let the
European Community off the GATT negotiations "hook" "and that we
need to keep up 'the competitive pressure if'we are to maintain
world market shares and make progress in the' GATT negotiations
during the next two years. Continuing'lower lodw rates, using
marketing' lo'ansj reducing ^set-asides, and- continuing export
enhancement programs in the 1990' Farm Bill are tools to achieve
this dbjectivea
The issue of flexibility is"' ' being ^discussed • from ' two
perspectiveso ' First, an increa'sihg number of analysts suggest
that the feedgrain program incentives, particularly for 'corn, (1)
are responsible for a declining share of'the world soybean market
and (B) represent barriers for the' adoption of • more
environmentally sound farm management practices. They suggest
that farmers be giveh' increased flexibility to' 'make prudent farm
management decisions decoupled rv oni the'distortions caused by
farm policy regulations and incentives-
A second flexibi 1 it'y'perspeci;i've has to-do-with the acreage
reduction programs and long-term conservation- reserve- The
drought dramatically reduced the wheat and feedgrain • carryover
stocks- The current wheat anci feedgrain carrybver'-'stocks are - at
levels'that have been lower in recent decades^•except' for a brief
period in the mid—1970s.
A "recent FAPRI report pegs total idled acreage in the U-iS-
for 19B8/S9 to be 80 million acres!" Because of the drought the
i t
annual set—aside will be reduced from SO percent to 10 pcrccnt
for feedgrains and from 27-5 to 10 percent for wheat. The 10
percent paid land diversion for feedgrains is also eliminated-
As a result, FAPRI expects about S'l million acres to come back
into production this next year-
Howeverp the U-S.. would have less than SO million acre
cushion left in the annual acreage reduction programs- The
remainder is in the long—term CRP- Presently there is 30 million
acres in the CRP- Howeverj the 19B5 Farm Bill calls for a
minimum of 'fO million acres and a maximum of 'i5 million acres to
be in the CRP by 1990. As a result, some analysts suggest thai;
this raises a question of flexibility and whether we should
continue to take an additional 10 to 15 million acres out of
production long term-
The final objective is that of reducing the budget deficit..
A point to remember here is that yes U-S- did spend a record
billion on farm programs during the 19S5 Farm Bill- But we are
now spending about half. One analyst recently suggested that it
may not be prudent for the LI..S„ to continue to reduce farm
program spending if we are serious about making progress in GAT I
because supposedly the European Community has not dramatically
reduced its $30 billion in farm program costs.
Howeverj on the other hand, the deficit problem is a majoi
cause of the trade deficit and has contributed to highev interest
rates. Both adversely affect agriculture- There- are only so many
ways to reduce the budget deficit- Agriculture will absoib its
"fair share" of cuts and has as mucli to gain as other sectors
from the positive effects of a deficit reduction policy-
F» ANALYZING THE ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS ' ^
SG?veral different cbmfflodity program^>^options are likely to
be discussed in the 1990 Farm Bill debate. A few now concepts are
presently being discussed by various special interests.. But they
will only be seriously considered if they achieve some of the
objectives that are not being achieved under the 1985 Farm Bill-
! • .1 i I • . '
For discussion purposes, I have selected five proposals For
comparison (Table !)• In some cases it is difficult to assign a
plus or minus in the absence of a detailed plan- With minor
modifications a minus could be turned into a plus and vice
versus- Therefore, if you disagree with my pluses and minusesj,
feel free to enter your own interpretations because you might be
thinking about a slightly different version than I used in this
analysis. I have only provided this model as food for thought-
• ' ' j
OPTION 1. CONTINUE CURRENT PROGRAMS. ""
Continuing the current program means that loan rates;/ would
remain' low and target prices would continue to be reduced slowly
from year to year to reduce budget exposure. The - Secretary's
authority ^ would continue for Acreage - Reduction Programsj
Conservation Reserve Program, Farmei—Owned Reserve and • Commodity
Credit Corporation operationsu
OPTION E.. GRADUATED PAYMENTS.
• ' • ' » , I I. ''
Rather thian reducing target prices to reduce program costs,
• I • ' ~ y II-
deficiency payments and commodity loans could be graduated- One
approach would be to lower the payment rates as size of farm,
acreage in production or volume of production increases- Another
approach is to apply the loans and deficiency payment rates only
to the portion of the crop needed for domestic use. The
remaining provisions in currcnt programs continue unchanged.
OPTION 3. DECOUPLING PROGRAM PAYMENTS FROM MANAGEMENT DECISIONS-
Several types of decoupling are being discussed. Here we
look at five approaches to decoupling farm program payments from
production decisions.
The firsl form of decoupling is Ihe voluntary form« The
19B5 Farm Bill included a 50-92 program. Later a 0-95 program was
added. These provisions allowed the Farm program participants to
receive deficiency payments based on 9S percent of Uheir
permitted acreage even though they elected to plant 50 to 92
percent or 0 to 92 percent of their permitted acreageM In other
words the farmer would receive the same payment regardless of how
much was planted. This program is a voluntary form of decoupling
and is a part of a more comprehensive farm policy.,
The second form of decoupling simply wc-uld utilize a
permanent historical commodity acreage base rather than one that
is base on tlie previous five years- This would decouple program
payments from current production and marketing decisions- New
entrants might be penalized under this approach unless special
allowances are incorporated into the policy.
Thirdp decoupling could be achieved by utilizing a whole
farm acreage base. A diversion payment could be made to farmers
based on a percentage of their whole farm base idledp then the
farmer could plant any crop mi); desired on the permitted acrcs.
A fourth type of decoupling would calculate payments to
farmers on the basis of an income means test criteria rather than
a farm production volume criteria'. Program payments would be
based on income much like other" nbnfarm geheral assistance
programs. If land ownership or volume of production is not used,
then this -form of decoupling woulci not only decouple prograni
payments from production decisions, but would.also decouple land
values- Farmland market values.would be capitalized basesd on
world commodity prices alone rather than world prices plus
program payments. • • . .
A fifth decoupling issue raises a debate on whetlier program
payments should be completely phased-out or whether the U«S.
should retain a farm income safety net. One proposal suggested
freezing current deficiency payment levels and phasing them down
over a specified period of years. During this period, farmers
would either exit or be prepared to compete at world markeU
prices without an income safety viet. Eventually set~asides would
also be phased outp but the conservation reserve would be
maintained- This is the form of decoupling assumed for analysis
purposes in Table 1-
QPTIQN 4.. A TARGETED MARKET IN0 LDAN-
Here, current nonrecourse loans and possibly deficiency payments
would be replaced by marketing loans. If the deficiency payments
are eliminated, the announced marketing loan rate would be
increased to current tSirget price levels. If tlie deficiency
payments are not replaced by the marketing loan, target prices
would be frozen at current levels- To reduce program costs, Ihe
percentage of production multiplied by the payment rate would be
reduced- For example, perhaps the marketing loan and/or Ihe
J L
deficiency payment would only be applied to the portion of the
commodity needed for domestic use^ One variation of this
proposal eliminates set-asides but maintains the CRP»
Alternatively, set—asides could also be used on a standby basis,
OPTION 5- MANDATORY PRODUCTION CONTROLS (SUPPLY MANABEMENT).
This approach would impose acreage allotments or marketing quotas
on all producers- Penalties would be imposed for not complying
with the restrictions on producliovi- A standby nonrecourse loan
would be implemented if price targets were not met..
Table 1- Farm and Food Policy Options
Policy Current
Objectives Program
Braduat
Payment
Decouple Targeted
Mkt Loan
Mandatory
Controls
1. Adequate Supply of Food + •i
•I—
H- High Quality Safe Food 1- •v -I- -I-
•I
3- Competitive in World -i- +— 4-H-
-
Markets
4- Farm Price and Income +-i-
+
Stability
•+"+
5- Rewards Efficient Farmers 4-
"
-H-
6- Provides Orderly Marketing -t- -I- -
-+• •f
Of Diverse Farm Products
i
7« Freedom and Flexibility in 7 •I-
+
Operating Farms
—1
8- Fosters Rural Economic -\—
h
Browth and Efficient
Food System
9- Promotes. Conservation and •+-I- M •i-
+
Protects Environment
10. Lower Government Costs +
+ i
11. Lower Consumer Costs
++ -
IS- Provides Family Farm + •i—
+ •h—
Safety Net
,, ,11 1., .
G- SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
1- The U»S- government initially supported prices,, set^aside
acreage and acquired grain reserves because the previous free
market policy resulted in price and income instability that was
judged to be politically unacceptable.
a. Since the 19S0s, commodity programs have caused- acreage
planted to crops to vary by 60 to 90•mi 11 ion acres between peaks
and troughs- The peaks and troughs were associated with the
Great Depression, World War II, Go-Go 1970s, and Farm Crisis of
the 19S0s. . ^ . j
3- There has been three levels of debate in recent Farm
Bills- These include the level of price and income supports, the
program structure, and deciding who should set the policy
parameters.
We can no longer set commodity policy in isolation of
international trade policy and global politics- The likely goals
of the 1990 Farm Bill include maintaining international
competitiveness, increasing flexibility, and government budgel
concerns.
5- Several options, including some new concepts, will likely
be placed on the table. The ability to analyze and respond to
them in an efficient manner may determine the length of the
debate as well as the effectiveness of the policy eventually
adopted.
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